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MacDonald: Criminal Intent And Knowledge As Requirements In Dangerous Drug Cases

NOTES
CRIMINAL INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE AS
REQUIREMENTS IN DANGEROUS DRUG CASES
Don MacDonald
INTRODUCTION
Montana's 1969 Dangerous Drug Act 1 made the possession of certain
drugs a crime unless the person in possession was excepted from the
act. On its face the act does not require anything more for conviction
than that state show possession of the prohibited substance. The applicable section of the act reads:
A person commits the offense of criminal possession of dangerous
drugs if he possesses any dangerous drug as defined in this act and
does not come within the exceptions' ...
What this section and the act as a whole fails to do is to address itself
to the question of whether or not criminal intent and knowledge of the
character of a drug3 are necessary requirements for a conviction of
criminal possession of dangerous drugs. 4 Because of the legislature's
failure to set out these requirements, the Supreme Court of Montana
has heard several cases dealing with these questions in the last four
years. The purpose of this note is to explore these cases to determine
the answers to two questions: 1. Is criminal intent required to establish
possession of dangerous drugs?; and, 2. If criminal intent is required,
can it be inferred from possession alone or must knowledge be shown
independently?
EARLY LAW
Possession of dangerous drugs did not pose the problems of criminal
intent and knowledge at common law that many courts now face. The
common law did not recognize possession of dangerous drugs as a crime
1

REnsIED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 54-129-54-138 (1947)
1947).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 54-133.

(hereinafter cited as R.C.M.

'As used in this note knowledge will, unless otherwise indicated, connote knowledge
of the nature of the character of the drug possessed. This type of knowledge is not
to be confused with knowledge of the fact that something is possessed. For example,
one could have knowledge that he possesses something and yet be totally unaware of
what he possesses. This second type of knowledge, knowledge of the character of
the thing possessed, is the type of knowledge referred to in this note.
'Although this note is primarily concerned with criminal intent and knowledge in regard to possession crimes, the problem is virtually the same for cases dealing with
the sale of dangerous drugs. The sale section of the drug act failed to require criminal intent or knowledge in cases dealing with the sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, on
its face, the section could provide punishment for someone who unknowingly and
without criminal intent sells a dangerous drug just as the possession section could
result in the punishment of one who unknowingly and without criminal intent possesses the drug.
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mainly because there were no dangerous drugs. It is only within the
last one hundred years that drug possession has been recognized as an
evil which the state should prohibit.5
Montana's first drug control laws were enacted in 1895.8 The
statutes limited the sale of opium but did not make the possession of the
drug a crime. In 1921 the legislature enacted the first statute making the
possession of certain drugs a crime. 7 This statute, like its successor
today, failed to mention criminal intent or knowledge as a prerequisite
to showing criminal possession. The statute did state that possession
or control was "presumptive evidence of a violation of this act,"'8 but
did not address itself to the other issues. In a case arising six years
after the passage of the 1921 statute, the Montana supreme court hinted
that lack of knowledge may be a legitimate defense to a possession
charge.9 This statement however, was dictum. Not until State v. Hood'0
did the court really face head-on the issues of criminal intent and knowledge.
In Hood police officers entered a room occupied by the appellant
and found a dictionary on which was printed "the property of Samuel
C. Hood."" The officers found cocaine inside the dictionary and Hood
was convicted of possession in district court. On appeal, Hood contended
that criminal intent had not been shown because the state had failed to
2
show the appellant had knowing possession of the narcotic substance.'
The supreme court agreed and reversed the lower court decision on the
grounds that there had been no showing that the appellant had knowing
possession of the cocaine. As the court pointed out:
If the book had belonged to the defendant, it may have been loaned

by him to the owner or occupant of the house, and it is just as rea-

sonable to suppose that some one other than (the) defendant con-

cealed cocaine in its binding. It does not appear that he had any
knowledge of the fact that it contained cocaine; . . . Here there was

no evidence connecting defendant with the conscious possession of
cocaine hydrochloride, and in consequence the court erred submitting
the case to the jury and in denying defendant's motion for a directed
verdict.'
Thus, according to Hood, a criminal intent was required to show possession and that intent could not be inferred from possession alone but
rather through knowledge of the nature of the thing possessed. In
other words, it was not enough for the state to show that Hood knew
he possessed a dictionary. Rather, the state had to show that Hood
knowingly possessed a dictionary containing cocaine.
5

State ex rel. Glantz v. District Court, 154 Mont. 132, 461 P.2d 193, 198 (1969).
MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED, § 654 (1895).
7
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 3200 (1921).
aid.
OState ex rel. Kuhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268 P. 501, 503 (1928).
1089 Mont. 432, 298 P. 354 (1931).
6

"Id. at 355.
2
1 Md.

23d.
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Montana's legislature replaced the 1921 statute with the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act 14 in 1937.15 The relevant portion of the act provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess,
... any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this act."' 6 Once again
there was no specific requirement of criminal intent or knowledge in
the statute. No Montana cases concerning these issues arose while
the Uniform Act was in effect in Montana.
In other jurisdictions the questions of intent and knowledge in possession cases sparked some controversy. The majority of states held
that a criminal intent in the form of knowledge of the character of the
drug must be shown to prove criminal possession. 17 Four states held
knowledge is not a prerequisite of criminal possession because no criminal intent is required with possession crimes.' Among the states not
adopting the Uniform Act, the decisions were split.19
The reasoning behind the minority position is simple: if the legislature wanted a criminal intent to be required the statute would have
so provided. As State v. Henker20 pointed out:
Had the legislature intended to retain guilty knowledge or intent as
an element of possession, it would have spelled it out.... The omission of the words 'with intent' evidences a desire to make mere posses-

sion or control a crime.'
Massachusetts has followed a slightly different type of rationale. 22 The
court there has relied on strict reasoning derived from a prohibition
case holding "the burden is placed upon the actor of ascertaining at his

14

R.C.M. 1947, §§ 54-101--54-128.
5Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico adopted the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act. Only California, Mississippi and Pennsylvania did not adopt the
act.
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 54-102.
"TParks v. State, 46 Ala. App. 722, 248 So.2d 761 (1971); Carroll v. State, 90 Ariz.
411, 368 P.2d 649 (1962); Mickens v. People, 148 Colo. 237, 365 P.2d 679 (1961);
People v. Pigrenet, 26 Ill.2d 224, 186 N.E.2d 306 (1962); State v. Williams, 250
La. 64, 193 So.2d 787 (1967); State v. Burns, 457 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1970); State
v. Faircloth, 181 Neb. 333, 148 N.W.2d 187 (1967); Wallace v. State, 77 Nev. 123,
359 P.2d 219 (1961); State v. Gonzales, 78 N.M. 591, 435 P.2d 210 (1967); People
v. Pippen, 16 App. Div.2d 635, 227 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1962); State v. Dempsy, 22 Ohio
St. 2d 219, 259 N.E.2d 745 (1970); Gonzales v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 8, 246 S.W.2d
199 (1951); Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
"Broic v. State, 79 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1955); Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d
115 (1957); Commonwealth v. Lee, 331 Mass. 166, 117 N.E.2d 830 (1954); State v.
Boggs, 57 Wash.2d 484, 358 P.2d 649 (1961).
"California ,after initially holding knowledge not to be an element of possession in
People v. Randolph, 133 C.A. 192, 23 P.2d 777 (1933) has since reversed itself and
joined the majority. People v. Cirilli, 265 C.A.2d 607, 71 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1968).
Pennsylvania has held knowledge not to be an element of possession. Commonwealth
v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Sup. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970). Mississippi has not considered
the problem.
150 Wash.2d 809, 314 P.2d 645 (1957).
"Id. at 647. Although the court said knowledge wasn't required, the court approved
a jury instruction requiring knowledge and actively sought out evidence of this
knowledge before affirming the jury verdict.
'Commonwealth v. Lee, supra note 18.
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peril whether his deed is within the prohibition of my criminal statute."2
Implicit in both minority positions is the consideration that it will be
extremely difficult for the state to prove a criminal intent or knowledge for possession crimes. If possession alone is a crime, the state will
have little difficulty in convicting violators. Once criminal intent or
knowledge is added to the possession requirement, however, the state's
burden is much greater. Thus, underlying the minority position is the
consideration that ease of prosecution dictates that bare possession be
sufficient to obtain a conviction without further proof.
The majority position is based upon the understandable concern
that a perfectly innocent person might physically possess a dangerous
drug while having no real knowledge of what the drug was or what he
actually possessed. 24 In Hood2 5 for instance, Hood or anyone else could
have bought the dictionary in which cocaine was found, had no knowledge of what the dictionary contained, and yet still be sent to prison
in a minority jurisdiction. Only with the retention of intent or know26
ledge is the innocent possessor spared such a fate.
THE DRUG ACT CASES
Montana replaced the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act with the Montana Dangerous Drug Act in 1969.27 The case of State ex rel. Glantz v.
District Court25 put the act to a constitutional test shortly after its
adoption. Since the act had failed to require criminal intent or knowledge for estabishing possession, the relators charged that the section
was unconstitutionally vague. In denying this constitutional challenge,
the court referred back to Hood29 to show that criminal intent and knowledge were required to show possession. The court pointed out that the
state did not have to go to the extent of showing a specific intent to
obtain a conviction. The court stressed, however, that "this does not
mean to imply that the state is relieved of showing that the defendant
knew the prohibited substance was in his possession."30 But how is the
defendant's knowledge of the prohibited substance to be shown? Can
it be inferred from possession alone or should it be shown independently? Glantz indicated that the knowledge should be shown independently:
Such knowledge can be proved by the evidence of acts, declarations,
or conduct of the accused from which the inference may be drawn
that he knew of the existence of the prohibited substance' ....
0Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910).
2eState v. Burns, supra note 17.
2eState v. Hood, supra note 10.
reState v. Dempsy, aupra note 17.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 54-129--54-138.
"State ex rel. Glantz v. District Court, supra note 5.
"State v. Hood, supra note 10.
"°State ex rel. Glantz v. District Court, aupra note 5 at 198.
alld.
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By requiring knowledge to be proved from acts, declarations, or conduct
of the accused, the court implicitly rejected the notion that knowledge
could be inferred from possession alone. Thus, Glantz indicated that
criminal intent was required to show possession of dangerous drugs
and that this intent was not to be inferred from possession alone.
The Montana supreme court took a new and inconsistent course
from Glantz when it decided State v. Trowbridge3 2 two years later. In
Trowbridge, possession of marijuana had been estabished through the
appellant's possession of a baggage claim tag that belonged to a bag
containing marijuana. The appellant had received the tag when she
checked the suitcase in for an airplane flight. On appeal, the appellant
contended that knowledge of the contents of the bag had not been
shown. In affirming the lower court's conviction, the court cited a
Colorado case, Petty v. People,33 which stated: "If possession is established, knowledge of the character of the drug and the fact that it is
possessed can be inferred therefrom. '34 By so reasoning the supreme
court changed it's position in Glantz. Although the state must show
criminal intent as well as knowledge, Trowbridge says this knowledge
can be inferred from possession alone. The court then went on, however,
to find evidence that the defendant did have some sort of knowledge
independent of possession. The fact that Trowbridge travelled under
an assumed name and was able to describe the suitcase with particularity
supported inferences of knowledge independent of possession. 35 Thus,
while the court in Trowbridge stated that knowledge can be inferred
from possession alone, the court looked for and found independent
evidence of knowledge.
The whole issue of knowledge and the inference of knowledge from
possession finally came to a head in State v. Anderson. 6 Although Anderson had been convicted for sale of dangerous drugs rather than
possession, the issues were identical to those faced in the possession
cases previously discussed.3 7 The defendant claimed that he had no
knowledge of the nature of the diet pills he sold and as such he did
not have the requisite criminal intent to commit a crime. He further
argued that a jury instruction implying knowledge from possession
alone was a clear misstatement of the law. The instruction read:
[I]f you believe that the Defendant sold dextro .(d) amphetamine
capsules which he knew were in his possession and under his physical
control, the lawtheimplies
knowledge by the Defendant of facts necessale criminal.en
sary to make

21 57 Mont. 527, 487 P.2d 530 (1971).
13167 Colo. 240, 447 P.2d 217 (1968).
3id. at 220.
85State v. Trowbridge, supra note 32 at 532.
"159 Mont. 344, 498 P.2d 295 (1972).
v 7See material supra note 4.
"'State v. Anderson, supra note 36 at 297.
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Simply stated, the law implied knowledge and a criminal intent from
the mere fact of possession alone prior to the sale. The supreme court
rejected the language used in the instruction. With Justice John C.
Harrison dissenting, the court reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial. The reasoning of the majority was summarized in three basic
points, all based on Glantz39. These points were:
(1) [K]nowledge is an essential element of the criminal act, (2)
knowledge can be proved by direct evidence, or (3) by evidence of
acts, declarations, or conduct of the accused from which an inference
law does not imply knowledge
of this knowledge may be drawn. The
from the fact of possession alone. '
The majority thus explicitly rejected the notion that knowledge could
41
be inferred from bare ptossession-the rationale found in Trowbridge.
Nowhere in the majority opinion, however, does the court note, overrule,
or even attempt to distinguish Trowbridge. Justice Harrison, in dissent, remained consistent with Trowbridge and argued that since possession had been established knowledge could be inferred. 42 Thus, Montana lawyers are left with two inconsistent positions with no real indication of which is correct.
As long as Trowbridge is still good law, it poses danger to innocent
possessors just as the minority position under the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act. 43 Under the minority position, no criminal intent is required;
mere possession is enough to obtain a conviction. According to Trowbridge, a criminal intent is required through a showing of knowledge,
but this knowledge can be inferred from possession. If this is true, the
innocent buyer of a dictionary with cocaine in its binding could be
convicted under either the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act minority position
or the Trowbridge rationale. For all practical purposes then, the two
positions are identical and equally distasteful.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note was to find the answer to two question:
1. Is criminal intent required to show possession of dangerous drugs?;
and, 2. If criminal intent is required, can it be inferred from possession
alone or must knowledge be shown independently? There is no question
that criminal intent is required to show possession in Montana. 44 When
dealing with the second question the Montana supreme court has been
less clear than with the first. While one case indicated that knowledge
can be inferred from possession alone, several others have indicated

"State ex rel. Glantz v. District Court, supra note 5.
"State v. Anderson, supra note 36 at 299.
41State v. Trowbridge, supra note 32.
2Interestingly enough, Justice John Harrison also wrote the majority opinion in State
4

v. Trowbridge.

Minority cases are listed at supra note 18.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 94-117 should also be noted.
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that knowledge must be shown independently. Until the supreme court
clarifies the question, either position may be correct. Due to the possible
injustice that could result when knowledge is inferred from possession,
the better view should require the state to show knowledge independently
of possession.
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